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faced complex ecological, socio-economic, and political challenges that made traditional models 
of protected areas unfeasible. Between 2001 and 2007, the Government of British Columbia 
announced  commitments  to  a  series  of  conservancies,  to  “government-to-government”  
negotiations with First Nations, and to ecosystem-based management and sustainable 
development in the remaining region, supported by a $120 million Conservation Opportunities 
Fund (COF). This innovative policy solution developed out of complex negotiations between 
ENGOs, industry, First Nations, local communities, and the province. American charitable 
foundations funded the campaigns of environmental nonprofit organizations (ENGOs) and 
contributed substantial amounts to the conservation-financing fund. While their role is frequently 
noted, it has not been adequately studied. Engaging the scholarly and professional conversations 
about the neoliberal underpinnings of philanthrocapitalism or venture philanthropy, I argue that 
the lens of governmentality – the techniques and rationalities of governance that produce and 
normalize patterns of thought and behaviour – draws attention to discursive as well as financial 
circulations, to agonistic relations and negotiations, and to processes of inclusion and exclusion. I 
then trace the circulation of financial resources and discursive representations between 
foundations and ENGOs between 1997 and 2007. Given concerns that neoliberal philanthropy 
may narrow ENGO campaigns and conservation solutions to those most amenable to market 
relations and may institutionalize neoliberal rationalities within recipient organizations, this 
paper raises crucial questions about the growing adherence to philanthrocapitalism within the 
foundations involved and the formation, articulation, and inclusion/exclusion of ENGO voices in 
the process of negotiating the made-in-BC solution.  
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AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS IN THE GREAT BEAR RAINFOREST: 
Philanthrocapitalism, Governmentality, and Democracy 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Great Bear Rainforest (GBR) – 6.4 million hectares of temperate rainforest in the 
Central and North Coast of British Columbia (BC) – is the site of a decades-long, multi-
stakeholder, transnational process of negotiating and implementing a framework for large-scale 
conservation and sustainable community development. Despite its ecological significance, by the 
1990s this region was threatened by old-growth logging, mining, and other industrial uses. 
Named Great Bear Rainforest by environmental non-government organizations (ENGOs) to 
build recognition for emergent conservation campaigns (Shaw 2004: 377, 389; Forest Ethics 
2006: 1), the region presented challenging circumstances that required new policy solutions to 
satisfy the provincial government, established forestry actors, ENGOs and coastal First Nations.1 
In 2001, 2006, and 2007, the Government of BC announced conservation policy decisions that 
were hailed by actors and observers as  an  important  “made-in-BC”  solution.  These decisions 
marked significant changes: from clear cut forestry to Ecosystem-Based Management (EBM) 
and from Class A parks to conservancies (Dempsey 2011; Low and Shaw 2011/2012); from the 
exclusion of Aboriginal rights, title, and interests to their prominent, if fragile, recognition 
through government-to-government relations (Low and Shaw 2011/2013; Dempsey 2011; Raitio 
and Saarikoski 2012); and from hierarchical government to negotiated modes of governance 
(Shaw 2004; Howlett et al. 2009; Raitio and Saarikoski 2012; Moore and Tjornbo 2012; 
Affolderbach et al. 2012), both through market-oriented campaign strategies and through the 
$120 million Conservation Opportunities Fund (COF) supporting sustainable economic 
                                                 
1 On BC forestry politics see Wilson 1998, Cashore et al. 2001, Magnusson and Shaw 2002, Cashore, Auld, and 
Newsom 2004, and Shaw 2004. 
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development and conservation management.2 Explanations for these transitions have traced the 
relationships between the innovative campaigns developed by sophisticated and globally-
oriented ENGOs (Shaw 2004; Dempsey 2011); the legal, cultural, and political claims presented 
by Indigenous rights movements (Davis 2009; Low and Shaw 2011/2012); the spatial and 
functional  “remapping”  processes  negotiated  by  stakeholders  (Affolderbach et al. 2012); the 
economic and governance transformations of neoliberalism (Howlett et al. 2009; Hayter and 
Barnes 2012; Raitio and Saarikoski 2012); and the possibilities and limitations for local 
democratic decision-making (Shaw 2004; see also Logan and Werkerle 2008: 2099).  
This paper focuses on a lacuna in the literature: the frequently referenced but largely 
unexamined role that American foundations played in supporting ENGO campaigns and the final 
conservation framework. A core group of American foundations provided substantial negotiated 
program support to ENGOs who worked on GBR conservation programs between 1997 and 
2007. They also provided funds to coastal First Nations (directly and with grants passed through 
ENGOs) (Davis 2009) and raised funds for the COF (Low and Shaw 2011/2012; Raitio and 
Saarikoski 2012; Saarikoski, Raitio, and Barry 2013), two of the most significant political 
developments in the GBR. These foundations utilized both business models of operations 
(efficiency, investment models, networking, and quantifiable outcomes) and market-oriented 
program activities and policy solutions (markets campaigns and conservation financing). This 
model, known as venture philanthropy or philanthrocapitalism, is defined not solely through such 
practices but by  a  rationale  “distinct  from  previous  ideas  about  philanthropy”  (Holmes  2012:  
195). Along with other features of a Fordist economy, such as  
regulation,  taxation  [and]  unionism…  traditional  philanthropy  …  a  tacit  
admission that giving back to the community was a compensation for the 
collateral injustices produced by the system. ... Rather than simply offering 
                                                 
2 The COF is part of the global use of conservation financing as a market-based conservation technique (Roth and 
Dressler 2012) 
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compensation  for  the  systems’  flaws,  [venture philanthropy] also demands a 
conversion  to  that  same  system’s  philosophy. Only if we submit to their 
ideological authority by accepting their quantiphilia will their funds be 
forthcoming (Bosworth 2011: 387). 
This  “neoliberalization  of  philanthropy”  concerns  “the  extension  of  market  logics,  discourses,  
techniques  and  motives  further  into  philanthropy”  (Holmes 2012: 196) but also into the policy 
fields and NGO communities within which they work (Bartley 2007: 230-231; Guthman 2008: 
1244-1245). Analyzing the role of American foundation philanthropy in the GBR is valuable, 
therefore,  “not  just  because  it  is  a  neglected  area  of  analysis,  but  because  it  tells  us  something  
about  the  processes  by  which  conservation  may  be  neoliberalizing”  (Holmes  2012:  186).  
This paper examines the relationship between three of the five foundations3 that supplied 
lead gifts to the COF – the Rockefeller Brothers Fund (RBF), The William and Flora Hewlett 
Foundation (Hewlett), and the David and Lucile Packard Foundation (Packard)4 – and six local 
and transnational ENGOs that received funding from these foundations,5 namely Ecotrust 
Canada, the David Suzuki Foundation (DSF), and the four organizations that comprise the 
Rainforest Solutions Project (RSP) coalition: Greenpeace Canada, ForestEthics, the Sierra Club 
of Canada – BC Chapter (SCC-BC), and Rainforest Action Network (RAN). By engaging the 
scholarly and professional conversations about the neoliberalization of philanthropy, and by 
tracing the circulation of money and discourses between foundations and ENGOs, I expand the 
existing literature on the variable neoliberalizations of conservation. Given concerns that 
neoliberal philanthropy may narrow ENGO campaigns and conservation solutions to those most 
amenable to profits and market relations (Holmes 2012: 200) and may function as a technique 
                                                 
3 The Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation began granting in BC after 2001, and the Wilburforce Foundation does 
not publish grants information. 
4 Other American funders in the GBR include the Pew Charitable Trusts (marine and aquaculture program), the 
Richard and Rhoda Goldman Fund, and the Lannan Foundation (Indigenous communities program). Two other 
major contributors stopped functioning in the early 2000s: the Turner Foundation due to lost asset value (AOL 
stock) and the W. Alton Jones Foundation due to internal disputes. 
5 Analyzing the role of American foundation funding of Canadian ENGO campaigns is highly sensitive due to the 
importance of this funding to ENGO vitality and to recent federal government criticism of the practice.  
 4 
that institutionalizes neoliberal rationalities within recipient organizations (Guthman 2008: 1245, 
1251), this paper raises crucial questions about the growing adherence to philanthrocapitalism 
within the foundations involved and the formation, articulation, and inclusion/exclusion of 
ENGO voices in the process of negotiating the made-in-BC solution. 
The first section outlines how venture philanthropy and philanthrocapitalism extend 
neoliberal logics: neoliberal philanthropy, as with neoliberalism more broadly, demonstrates 
continuities and discontinuities with earlier modes of liberalism (McCarthy and Prudham 2004); 
patterns and resemblances rather than monolithic and universal processes (McCarthy and 
Prudham 2004; Hayter and Barnes 2012); and points of friction that result in unique mutations 
(Hayter and Barnes 2012). Approaching neoliberal philanthropy through the lens of 
governmentality – the techniques and rationalities of governance that produce and normalize 
patterns of thought and behaviour – draws attention to discursive as well as financial circulations 
(Guthman 2008; Holmes 2012), to agonistic relations and negotiations, and to processes of 
inclusion and exclusion. This approach emphasizes the need to look beyond governance as 
policy creation and towards variable modes of constitutions of and accountability for political 
spaces, actors, and authorities.  
The second section analyzes the  foundations’  circulation, in the Great Bear Rainforest, of 
neoliberal rationales via financial resources and discursive constructions. Using public 
information, I trace the flow of funding from the foundations in question to ENGO campaign 
activities, to the COF, and to supporting processes. Further, I trace program priorities and 
activities as described in annual reports, news releases, and program statements. While designed 
as strategic documents to communicate institutional capacity, attract high-level and/or grass-
roots support, and shape policy negotiations, these documents are politically performative rather 
than solely strategic. I use these data not to construct a definitive historical narrative of 
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foundations’  actions  and  influences  but  to  develop interpretive conclusions about the techniques 
and implications of these circulations of financial and discursive resources. First, the 
transnational relationships between philanthropic foundations and ENGOs act as a particular 
instance  of  the  “frictions”  (Hayter and Barnes 2012: 202-203) that mutate neoliberal 
conservation strategies in particular places, though these frictions are not simply “local.”  Second,  
negotiated program support, itself an apparent mutation, encourages ENGOs to absorb 
foundations’  priorities  into  institutional commitments and program practices.  Finally, despite 
evidence of mutual mutation, the substantial resources mobilized by foundations had the capacity 
to effectively prioritize some ENGO actors within the BC policy network and exclude other 
ENGO actors from it. While Dempsey (2011: 220) argues that  “the  successes  achieved  [in the 
GBR] depended on …  environmentalists departing from ideal ethical/moral positions as a part of 
their political strategy,” this research suggests that such decisions are not purely self-directed 
strategic choices, but (at best) the results of agonistic negotiations, or (at worst) decisions 
required to remain within the financial circulations that made campaigns possible. Therefore, 
financial resources and governmental techniques of the American foundations in the GBR were 
crucial to ENGO participation in the made-in-BC solution, but also contributed to “bracketing 
out and excluding broader issues in the region and (more radical) voices  and  visions” (Dempsey 
2011: 220). 
The final section discusses implications for claims about the politics, and particularly the 
democratic politics, of the GBR. Wendy Brown (2003) argues that neoliberalism has 
fundamentally mutated the spaces, actors, and authorities of modern liberal democracy, which 
suggests that the stakes of the neoliberalization of philanthropy and conservation are very high 
indeed. Despite  the  foundations’  strong claims of supporting democracy and accountability, the 
extensive involvement of American foundations in the Great Bear Rainforest campaigns, and the 
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complexity of the transnational economic and discursive circulations at work, raise crucial 
questions about how foundations can be held politically accountable: for the constitution of 
political actors via agonistic power relations; for the constitution of political spaces via processes 
of inclusion/exclusion; and for the constitution of their own authority when they are outside both 
state-based and local community-based democratic structures and institutions. While suggestive 
rather than conclusive, this research sheds light on the profound political problematics posed by 
contemporary global conservation efforts. 
 
2. NEOLIBERAL PHILANTHROPY AS GOVERNMENTALITY  
 
The large-scale capital supplied by American foundations was crucial for the “made-in-
BC”  policy  solution  (Davis 2009; Raitio and Saarikoski 2012). This “outside” funding raises 
concerns about vulnerabilities in recipient ENGOs to withdrawn funding (Wilson 1998: 59-61; 
Bernstein 1997: 198-199, 253-254); about direct foreign foundation involvement in domestic 
policy negotiations (Bernstein and Cashore 2000: 97-98) and democratic accountability in 
domestic policy formation (Wilson 1998); and about colonial  “paternalisms”  being  reproduced  
through funding relations with First Nations (Davis 2009: 150, 153). Developing trends in 
philanthropy increasingly circulate of neoliberal priorities within policy fields, resulting in the 
perception that institutional philanthropy “favour[s] certain forms of environmentalism which are 
friendly to capitalism, or at least not directly threatening  to  it”  (Holmes  2012:  189).  The risk is 
not that recipient ENGOs consciously adopt neoliberal priorities, but that neoliberal philanthropy 
constrains “the  thinkable  and  hence  actable”  within  a field of debate (Guthman 2008: 1242). By 
understanding neoliberal philanthropy as governmentality, this section develops a framework for 
analyzing foundations’  operating  rationales  and  funding  practices in the Great Bear Rainforest.  
Charitable foundations are legal entities that receive tax incentives to redistribute assets 
for public purposes, within restrictions on the types and locations of organizations that can be 
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funded. They are embedded within both the state and the market, as their capacity is determined 
by their legal status and the fluctuating values of their invested assets. Foundations of the 
endowment size studied here are governed by Boards, which set overall areas of interest and 
over-arching goals, with each program area defining specific geographical areas of operation. 
Program staff develops the strategies and program requirements, advise applicants on suitable 
projects and budgets, and submit grant recommendations to their Boards. Such large-scale, 
institutionalized philanthropy is more common in the US than Canada, for economic, historical, 
and philosophical reasons (Hewlett 2003: 15), and operates with a higher grants budget. 
Therefore, while Canadian ENGOs often apply to Canadian foundations, applications to major 
American foundations are frequently required to finance major campaigns.  
Charitable foundations in the American context have been analyzed according to 
pluralism (Delfin and Tang 2007; Lowry 1999), elitism (Arnold 1999), Gramscian hegemony 
(Arnove 1980; Fisher 1983; Bulmer and Fisher 1984, Roelofs 2003), and Weberian analyses of 
religion, capital accumulation, and philanthropy (Hewa 1997; Karl and Katz 1987). There are 
additional American literatures on foundations as central to democratic culture, formal 
democratic  institutions  (O’Connell  1999;;  Prewitt  1999), and mediating state and capital. The 
relationship between institutional philanthropy and regimes of capital accumulation is reflected 
in the shift from foundations created through profits from the industrial manufacturing centers of 
the eastern US, to foundations endowed by post-industrial accumulation in the west, particularly 
California and Seattle. This shift highlights foundations’  embeddedness in neoliberal 
transformations in economic and political spaces and practices. Though variably defined, 
neoliberalism is commonly identified by a set of shared characteristics: privatization, 
marketization, deregulation, reregulation, and utilization of market logics of efficiency and 
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competitiveness (Castree 2008a: 142).6 Research on the neoliberalization of charitable 
philanthropy links these broad transformations to a new form of philanthropy which assumes: 1) 
that business models of deregulated capitalism are the most effective and efficient mode of 
organizing philanthropy and 2) that market techniques and mechanisms form the best possible 
solution to social, cultural, and environmental challenges (Holmes 2012: 188). This model of 
philanthropy has been termed venture philanthropy (modeled on venture capitalism) or 
philanthrocapitalism. While frequently used to refer to the charitable giving of elite wealthy 
individuals (Rogers 2011), philanthrocapitalism is also prevalent in charitable foundations. 
Outlining the value of venture capitalism to philanthropy, Letts et al. (1997: 44) argue 
that:  
…the  venture  capital  model  emerged  from  years  of  practice  and  competition.  
It is now a comprehensive investment approach that sets clear performance 
objectives, manages risk through close monitoring and frequent assistance, 
and plans the next stage of funding well in advance.  
Venture philanthropy explicitly replicates the practices  of  venture  capitalism:  “demanding  clear  
performances  metrics  and  accountability  from  nonprofits;;”  “conduct[ing]  due  diligence…  and  
monitor[ing] post-grant performance; using  “rigorous  selection  processes;”  and  “partner[ing]  
with fund recipients to formulate and execute a strategy for delivering  social  impact”  (Kaplan  
and Grossman 2010: 113). To this list of quantifiable wins, strict evaluation, and negotiated 
support, Holmes (2012: 193-194) and Rogers (2011: 376) add networking, whereby groups of 
foundations determine shared philanthropic goals and strategies (eg: Environmental 
Grantmakers’  Alliance);;  collaborate  to  “aggregate  and  direct”  grant  resources  (Hewlett  2005:  ix); 
and facilitate interactions between grant recipients to influence program strategies. Further, 
“intermediary”  institutions  increasingly function  as  “mutual  funds,”  soliciting  donors  and  
performing due diligence and evaluation on recipient nonprofits (Kaplan and Grossman 2010: 
                                                 
6 See also Castree 2008b, Bernstein 2002, and Guthman 2008. 
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112). As with other financial advisors, these intermediaries receive a proportion of funds to cover 
administrative costs. This “nascent  capital  marketplace  for  non-profits”  operates  by  “measuring  
the social impact of donations and offering ways to funnel dollars to the most-effective 
nonprofits” (Kaplan and Grossman 2010: 112); it transforms grants from donations into 
investments that derive profit, whether through self-funding programs or broader social, cultural, 
or environmental gains (Kaplan and Grossman 2010: 115).  
Therefore, charitable foundations increasingly are placed within broader processes of 
economic neoliberalization: their endowments profit from the transnational globalized space of 
market performance, and their grants are distributed through a transnational practice of investing 
in global social opportunities. Yet neoliberalism is both a continuation and reconfiguration of 
liberalism, displaying continuities in some goals and strategies, and radical changes in others 
(McCarthy and Prudham 2004: 277). Similarly, neoliberalism is not a singular, universal, or 
monolithic process, but rather a question of patterns, logics, and resemblances that repeat, 
amplify, or attenuate within specific contexts (McCarthy and Prudham 2004: 276). Insofar as 
neoliberalism exists in process and policy, it must be worked out in place, and thus is vulnerable 
to  local  “frictions” and “mutations” (Hayter and Barnes 2012). Recent work has engaged how 
neoliberal logics might affect policy processes and decisions in the GBR through opportunity or 
constraint (Raitio and Saarikoski 2012), and how GBR campaigns and negotiations might affect 
the instantiation and transformation of neoliberal logics in BC (Shaw 2004). Analyses of the 
possible role of neoliberal techniques of philanthropy must be similarly attentive to continuities 
as well as discontinuities, to patterns of amplification and attenuation, and to frictions and 
mutations.  
Further, neoliberalism is not merely the growing influence of the (economic) market over 
the (political) liberal state, but the discursive spread of a distinct form of rationality that plays out 
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in economic relations, governance, and subjectivity (Brown 2003). Understanding how 
neoliberalism operates at this level requires analyses of techniques of governmentality. 
Governmentality studies the  “rationality  characteristic  of the systematic thinking, reflection, or 
knowledge  that  is  integral  to  different  modes  of  governing”  (Sending  and  Neumann  2006:  657).  
It  respatializes  conceptions  of  power,  from  a  stable  ‘thing’  that  can  be  lost  or  won  in  a  policy  
process, to the circulation of capacities, relations of influence, and generation of conditions. It 
further reconceptualizes political actors, from pre-existing personal or institutional identities to 
the agonistic constitution of political actors through interactions of mutual effect and multiple 
affect, redirecting analytical  attention  to  “how  certain  identities  and  action-orientations are 
defined  as  appropriate  and  normal  and  how  relations  of  power  are  implicated  in  these  processes”  
(Sending and Neumann 2006: 657). As an analytical tool, governmentality brings particular 
processes of circulation, constitution, and normalization into focus. It emphasizes that 
philanthrocapitalism cannot be understood solely through economic terms (arguably, the 
proportion of grant money provided by explicitly “venture” philanthropists is minor) but through 
discursive  practices  of  “performance  and  representation”  in  the  circulation  of  words  and  images  
(Holmes 2012: 199). Charitable foundations increasingly participate in a complex neoliberal 
economy whereby money is one element of a circulating rationality of efficiency, accountability, 
and quantifiability (Guthman 2008). Ultimately, this approach enables a distinction to be drawn 
between governance, as processes of policy creation and acts of policy authority, and 
governmentality as the political constitution of spaces, actors, and authorities. This focus shifts 
the analytical question, from how did policy change happen, to what visions of politics are at 
stake and who exercises authority over these visions? 
In the following section, this framework of a variable and vulnerable neoliberal political 
economy of circulating resources and rationalities is used to read a range of publicly available 
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documents that detail the  foundations’  role as grantors and the purpose and rationality of their 
grant-making, and to quantify the value and purpose of their grants, as documented in annual 
reports and grants databases. These sources pose specific complications. Annual reports, for 
example, satisfy the requirement for evaluation and accountability, yet are also used for strategic 
networking and positioning, which may lead to the amplification of some aspects of program 
work and the silencing of others. Likewise, even when grants information is publicly available, 
legal restrictions on amounts and geographic regions of grants can lead to regranting, whereby 
funds reach their intended grantee via “intermediary” institutions (Kaplan and Grossman 2010: 
112). This practice can make it difficult to identify final recipients and, in this case, made it 
necessary to cross-reference information from foundations, common intermediaries, and possible 
recipients. Further research, such as interviews, would be required to build a comprehensive 
historical account of American foundation participation in the Great Bear Rainforest. However, 
these documents and databases offer a valuable opportunity to trace the circulation of grant 
monies and the repetition of philanthropic rationalities, highlighting the mutations and the limits 
to mutations when neoliberal philanthropy encounters local frictions.  
 
3. AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS IN THE GREAT BEAR RAINFOREST 
 
3.1 Embodying Neoliberal Rationalities  
 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund (RBF) was established in New York in 1940 by the children 
of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and is connected to a history of family philanthropy. Its mission is 
“to  promote  the  well-being of all people through support of efforts in the United States and 
abroad that contribute ideas, develop leaders, and encourage institutions in the transition to 
global interdependence”  (RBF 1999: 13). The Hewlett and Packard Foundations, founded by the 
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originators of the Hewlett-Packard computer company, are legally and practically distinct 
entities.  The  Packard  Foundation  was  founded  in  1964  to  encourage  “integrity,  effectiveness, 
respect  for  all  people,  belief  in  individual  leadership,  and  the  capacity  to  ‘think  big’”  (1999:  3).  
The Hewlett Foundation was founded in 1966 by David Hewlett with  the  mission  to  “promote  
the well-being of mankind by supporting selected activities of a charitable nature, as well as 
organizations  or  institutions  engaged  in  such  activities”  (Hewlett  1999:  iii).  Between 1997-2001, 
each institution transitioned leadership. In 1998, Richard T. Schlosberg III, a Harvard MBA and 
former CEO and publisher of the LA Times, became President and CEO of the Packard 
Foundation. In 1999, Paul Brest, former Dean of Stanford Law School and a leading theorist of 
the role of non-profits in society, became president of the Hewlett Foundation. Stephen B. 
Heintz, whose background was in government and non-profit management, particularly the 
intersection of democracy and sustainable development, became president of RBF in 2001. 
These transitions responded to global transformations: in his first public statement, Schlosberg 
III claimed “we  live  in  an  era  of  …  previously  unimagined  alliances  among  the  public,  private, 
and independent sectors… Experience, wisdom, organizational structures, and financial capital 
will cross programs, unite disciplines, and introduce new ways of crafting solutions to the 
world’s  problems”  (Packard  1998). The flexibility and reach of their financial capital was crucial 
to the vision of foundation success, with Packard (1999:7) arguing that its position within the 
high technology industry of California  placed  it  at  “the  centre  of  the  new  global  economy.”7 
Between 1997-2007, the  language  used  in  all  three  foundations’  literature increasingly 
mobilizes features of philanthrocapitalism: business models of institutional organization; a 
                                                 
7 A possible sixth lead funder to the COF is TOSA Foundation (California), created by John P. Morgridge (Cisco 
Systems). Catherine Muther, who established her charitable foundation after working with Morgridge, describes 
venture philanthropy as a change from reactionary, hierarchical structures of the past to team-oriented structures of 
the present. She describes philanthropy as a growth industry in Silicone  valley,  arguing  that  “what  we’re  doing  is  
really  a  reflection  of  how  we  learned  to  do  business”  (www.3gf.org/news_sb.html). 
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climate  of  “investment”  and market solutions; negotiated operating support; efficiency, 
evaluation, and quantifiable wins; and networking. Writing in Smart Money (2003), Hewlett 
president Paul Brest suggests the  term  “strategic  philanthropy,” yet his model uses the same 
language and depends on the same rationality:  
“The essence of strategic philanthropy is that (1) the funder specifies 
objectives and has a plausible (strategic) plan …; (2) the funder seeks grantee 
organizations that share its aims, and engages in due diligence …; (3) the 
funder and its grantees articulate how they will ascertain if they are moving 
toward their shared objectives; and (4) they take reasonable steps to assess 
progress and evaluate outcomes. If there is a polar alternative to strategic 
philanthropy, it is a funder having a vague set of goals or preferences (for 
example,  “protect  the  environment”…),  waiting for organizations with 
interesting ideas or projects to come knocking, and making grants with little 
due diligence or agreed- upon  objectives,  strategies,  and  milestones.”  (48) 
 
All three foundations share the commitment to  viewing  philanthropy  through  “an  underlying  
model of investment, risk and return [that] provides the basis for making big bets where success 
is  hardly  assured  but  the  social  payoff  is  extraordinarily  high”  (Hewlett  2003:  xvii).  The 
commitment to evaluation and accountability is also shared. The Packard Foundation highlights 
accountability and self-evaluation for themselves and grantees (Packard 1999: 5), and by 2001 
created a Director of Evaluation.  RBF undertook an extensive internal strategic review process 
between 2000 and 2002, which culminated in new performance evaluation processes, including a 
yearly “Statistical Review of RBF Operations.” Brest led each Hewlett annual report with an 
extended essay on project development, analysis, and evaluation for foundations and the 
organizations they fund (Hewlett 2000: vii-xi). Finally, Brest (2003) outlines the model of 
negotiated operating support that derives from the venture philanthropic model, highlighting the 
“essentially  contractual  nature”  of  a  relationship  “where  the  funder  and  organization  agree  on  
outcomes, strategies, measures of progress, and reporting  requirements”  (2003:  49).  While  the  
risks of this model are that  “…the  funder  must  sometimes  tolerate  ‘slippage’  between  its  
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strategic  focus  and  the  organization’s  operations,  and  the  organization  will  bear  some  loss  of  
autonomy as well as the additional administrative costs of due diligence, evaluation, and 
reporting,”  the  claimed benefit  is  that  “[a]greement  on  a  strategic  plan  and  the  valuation  process  
conduces to the [ENGO]’s  achievement  of  its  own  goals,”  (Brest  2003:  50-51). 
Thus, though not self-titling as venture philanthropists or philanthrocapitalists, these 
foundations’  processes  and  priorities  adhere to its main tenets. Further,  Brest  writes  that  “while  
[w]e understand our work to be more in the nature of a craft than  science  or  economics….  the 
investment metaphor embodies an attitude that  presses  the  staff  to  use  the  Foundation’s  
resources  as  effectively  as  possible”  (Hewlett  2003:  xvii-xviii; emphasis in original), implicitly 
recognizing that the circulation of representations, metaphors, and other discursive objects 
constitute actors who embody philanthrocapitalist rationalities. This raises the risk that 
foundations may, through negotiated support,  be  “setting  the  overall  agenda  in  environmentalism  
towards  less  radical  forms”  (Holmes  2012:  190). To understand how these risks are negotiated in 
the Great Bear Rainforest, it is necessary to trace the relationships amongst actors and the 
financial and discursive resources that they circulated, and observe possible mutations as well as 
constraints to these mutations.  
 
3.2 Circulating Neoliberal Rationalities 
 
 
In 1997, after four years supporting Clayoquot Sound conservation campaigns, the 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, through the “leadership”  of  Program  Officer  Michael  Northrop,  
initiated foundation involvement in the Great Bear Rainforest (RBF 2003: 12). The six ENGOs 
studied here used the substantial financial and institutional support of RBF, Hewlett, and Packard 
to pursue research, campaigns, negotiations, and innovative policy alternatives for the GBR. 
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They developed new strategies, techniques, and alliances, particularly incorporating lessons from 
Clayoquot Sound (Shaw 2004; Low and Shaw 2011/2012; Dempsey 2011). Ecotrust Canada 
focused on developing conservation economies (Ecotrust Canada 2000: 2), including mapping 
the relationship between cultural and natural resources with the Heiltsuk and Haisla Nations. The 
David Suzuki Foundation, through their Pacific Salmon Forests (PSF) project, focused on 
biodiversity research, public communications, and political, legal, and technical support to 
Indigenous communities through the Turning Point Initiative (later called Coastal First Nations).8 
When PSF ended in 2001, DSF focused on assessments of ecosystem-based management 
standards in land-use plans and logging permits, and on marine conservation. They also 
continued to support Coastal First Nations until at least 2007 (Low and Shaw 2011/2012). By 
developing shared goals and a unified negotiating body, the Coastal First Nations transformed 
the overall context of the GBR campaign (Low and Shaw 2011/2012; Raitio and Saarikoski 
2012). The Raincoast Solutions Project (RSP) united international markets campaigns 
(Rainforest Action Network and ForestEthics); community grassroots organization and advocacy 
(RAN, Greenpeace Canada, and SCC-BC); conservation-based development for First Nations 
and non-indigenous communities; and participation in land-use planning processes. The 
cooperative relationship developed between RSP and five major forestry companies operating in 
the region, known as the Joint Solutions Project (JSP), negotiated internal agreements over 
logging practices, protection areas, and development timeframes based on compromises 
acceptable to all parties. The decision between the ENGO and industry members of JSP to call a 
moratorium on logging and the international markets campaign and begin serious negotiations, 
created a second significant shift in the political climate (Shaw 2004; Howlett et al. 2009; Raitio 
and Saarikoski 2012; Saarikoski et al. 2013).  
                                                 
8 coastalfirstnations.ca/about 
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This work was supported through conservation strategies at each foundation. In the late 
1990s, under its “Sustainable  Resource  Use”  program, the goal of Rockefeller Brothers Fund in 
BC was  “sound  environmental  stewardship at the intersection of ecological, economic, and 
cultural concerns” (RBF 1999: 23). It funded market-based efforts to increase sustainable wood 
products, litigation to establish First Nations’ legal rights, and sustainable development 
alternatives in First Nations communities (RBF 1999: 25-26). In 1998 the Packard Foundation 
began granting to ENGOs in the GBR through a five-year Cascadia marine conservation 
program (including connected watersheds and old-growth forests),  in  “pivotal  sites  where human 
talent, financial capital, and environmental needs now intersect to offer opportunities for 
achieving  maximum  benefit”  (Packard  1998:  15). The goal was “to  protect  the  ecological  
integrity”  of  the  coastal temperate rainforest and to fund scientific research as the basis for 
conservation policies. From the late 1990s, Hewlett granted to GBR campaigns under  the  “Rural  
Communities  and  the  Environment”  strategy,  which  “supports  organizations  working  on  the  
integration of rural community development and environmental protection through technical 
assistance,  scientific  research,  and  demonstration  projects  of  regional  significance”  (Hewlett  
1998: 30). This program emphasized economic growth, not just maintenance, and supported 
“community-based problem solving that achieves economic development objectives without 
sacrificing  environmental  values”  (Hewlett  2000:  20). At the midway of the 10-year study 
period, each foundation reformulated its program goals and priorities. In 2003, RBF developed 
new program guidelines that emphasized collaboration between government, business, and civil 
society, and a new strategy for BC to support conservation and sustainable use of coastal 
temperate rainforest (RBF 2003a: 6-7). In 2002-2003, Hewlett redefined its grants in the region 
as  “permanently  protect[ing]  vast  tracks of wilderness areas”  and “promoting  collaborations  to  
build  sustainable  economies”  (Hewlett  2002:  25-27). After 2003, Packard restricted their focus to 
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marine conservation, and grants to GBR campaigns were  funded  under  their  “Special  
Opportunities”  program. 
Over the ten years studied, these three foundations invested substantial financial 
resources to support ENGO conservation visions for the Great Bear Rainforest (figure 1). 
Between 1998 and 2007, RBF funded Ecotrust Canada ($1.2 million total), DSF ($675,000), 
SCC-BC ($330,000), ForestEthics ($295,000), and RAN ($400,000).9 It also contributed $1 
million to the COF and supported Tides Canada Foundation ($100,000). Beginning in 1999, 
Packard granted to Ecotrust Canada ($300,000), DSF ($1.55 million), RSP jointly ($2.68 
million), and ForestEthics ($725,000). It also provided funds directly to Coastal First Nations 
($175,000 in 2006), to American organizations to support GBR campaigns,10 and to Tides 
Canada, Tides US, and the COF (combined nearly $9 million). From 1999-2007, the Hewlett 
Foundation funded Ecotrust Canada ($750,000), DSF ($1.8 million), RSP jointly ($3 million), 
and ForestEthics ($700,000). Hewlett also provided funds to American organizations in support 
of the GBR campaign,11 to Coastal First Nations ($340,000), and to Tides Canada, Tides US, and 
the COF (a combined $3.5 million).  
                                                 
9 As per annual reports, online grants databases, and other public financial information. Best efforts have been made 
to compile complete grants listings. Flow-through grants have been cross-referenced where possible; in all cases, 
funds were tallied for final known recipient. The awards for ForestEthics and RAN are designated for unspecified 
markets campaigns, which likely include, but are not clearly restricted to, GBR campaigns. Hewlett grants to DSF 
from 2004 onwards include funds for Coastal First Nations, which may have supported DSF staff, been passed 
through to CFN, or some combination. The nearly complete absence of grants to Greenpeace suggests that all funds 
flowed to them via other organizations, whether RSP or Tides Canada/Tides US. All grants figures are in American 
dollars, with the value in Canadian funds dependent on exchange rates when grant cheques were received. 
10 Including:  1)  The  Nature  Conservancy  (Seattle,  WA),  2005,  $24,000  “to  implement  an  EBM  framework  for  the  
GBR;;”  2)  Spitfire  Strategies  (Washington,  D.C.),  2007,  $19,000  “to  support  strategic  assistance  around  the  GBR  
announcement.”  (Packard on-line database).   
11 Including:  1)  Tides  Foundation  (San  Francisco,  CA),  2007,  $1  million  “for short term support to allow start-up 
and implementation plans to proceed on the Great Bear Project.”  Tides  Foundation  does  not  undertake  program  
work, and the grant is not designated to the COF, so likely regranted. 2) The Nature Conservancy (Arlington, VA), 
2004, $345,000 to support the GBR fundraising campaign (to raise COF fund). 3) Trust for Public Land (San 
Francisco, CA), 2004, $1.25 million to support conservation financing program. Trust for Public Land is listed as 
providing technical support to the campaign to develop a conservation financing framework that would work in BC. 
(Hewlett on-line database) 
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While  this  substantial  funding  supports  Wilson’s  (1998)  concern  about  ENGO  
vulnerability to funding withdrawal, the relations created between foundations and ENGOs, and 
amongst ENGOs, are more complex. Grant descriptions suggest that the specific conditions of 
the Great Bear Rainforest and the institutional structures of recipient ENGOs required 
foundations to accept a hybrid form of negotiated program support: funds were directed to 
specific project work rather than general revenue, but with the same requirements of negotiation, 
evaluation, and accountability. Multi-stage  application  processes,  characterized  as  “professional”  
(RBF  2004:  11)  or  even  “arduous”  (Hewlett  2003:  xix),  involved  detailed paper proposals and 
in-person meetings between ENGO management and foundation program staff (Hewlett 2003: 
xix; RBF 1999: 17). ENGO boards and executives have primary responsibility for grant 
negotiations (Young 2011: 567; Asproudis 2011: 148), while staff provides support on program 
details, application and report writing, and accounting. Grant approval depends on fit with 
Board-defined program goals and on due diligence to establish strategic analysis of the context, 
perceived viability, and  organization  track  record,  but  also  on  the  “individualized,  intuitive  
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assessments”  (Hewlett  2000:  vii),  “special  qualities  of  judgment”  (Hewlett  2003:  xix),  and  
“considerable  responsibility and  authority”  (RBF  2004:  13)  of  the  program  officers,  who  then  
“follow  projects  along  throughout  the  life  of  the  grant  and  evaluate  the  project  at  the  end  of  the  
period”  (RBF  1999:  18).  The  program  officer  is  both  a  repository  of  foundations’  considerable 
institutional knowledge (Hewletter 2000: ix) and a central figure in grantee/foundation 
relationships (RBF 2001: 4). The significance of negotiations and evaluations of these 
investments, through both institutionalized processes and highly personalized relationships, 
cannot be overstated.  
ENGOs cooperate to achieve shared conservation goals, but also compete with each other 
for financial resources and policy influence in pursuit of these goals (Asproudis 2011: 143, 148). 
As substantial, multi-year grants provided the financial security to engage in the GBR as long-
term actors, ENGOs faced significant internal pressure, and potential inter-organizational 
competition, to negotiate support from these foundations. Further, the “arduous”  application  
processes required investment of significant executive and staff resources with no guarantee of 
securing funds and with the risk of being redirected from their own program priorities to those of 
the grantors (Brest 2003: 50-51). These negotiations created pressure not just to succeed in 
funding applications but, more importantly, to succeed in building strong relationships with 
foundations’  program  officers  and  thereby  shape funders’  conservation  goals  and  strategies.  
ENGOs can therefore be understood as dual advocats: on one hand, they aim to influence 
specific policies to be formalized by the BC government; on the other, they have to influence the 
“policy”  of  foundations, as this determines grant priorities and their own viability as grant 
recipients. This raises the  likelihood  of  a  secondary  form  of  policy  “competition”  between  
ENGOs, this time centred on funding networks rather than government.  
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While the hybrid form of negotiated program support in the Great Bear Rainforest can be 
considered a local mutation of a primary feature of philanthrocapitalism, its competitive structure 
is central to its function as a technique of agonistic subjectivization, whereby neoliberal 
rationalities and practices are constituted, circulated, and mutated. The foundations circulated 
their commitments to a funding model of business operations and social investments that balance 
risks and potential rewards, and parallel formulations circulated through ENGO operational and 
program rationale: from claims about the “entrepreneurial”  era  that  requires a foundation to be 
“sleek  and  efficient  in  its  organizational  design,  prone  to  judicious  risk-taking to achieve 
important  ends,  and  committed  to  rigorous  assessment  and  evaluation”  (Packard  1998:  5); to 
Ecotrust  Canada’s model  of  “capitalizing  the  conservation  economy;;”  to ForestEthics  or  RAN’s  
emphasis on quick-moving markets campaigns. Further, foundations increasingly articulate the 
case for Great Bear Rainforest conservation according to a business rationale that evaluates the 
territorial scale of conservation against the financial scale of investment:  
The opportunities for large-scale wilderness protection in [GBR] are 
enormous….  The  scale  …  the  biological  significance,  the  time-limited 
opportunity, the imagination, foresight, and commitment of the Canadian 
environmental  organizations,  the  commitment  of  Canada’s  indigenous  peoples  
(First Nations) to sustainability, and the continued strength of the American 
dollar all provide compelling rationales for continued work in Canada 
(Hewlett 2003: 26-27). 
In the same year, Ecotrust Canada stated that it intended to reinvigorate itself as an organization 
by increasing the scale of its activity to match the scale of the conservation opportunity. More 
importantly, this rationale becomes increasingly financialized, with both the Rockefeller 
Brothers Fund and the Hewlett Foundation emphasizing the scale of the conservation victory 
(transformed land-management practices over an entire 6.4 hectare region) for the overall cost of 
the COF (only $60 million to foundations and individuals, and an additional $60 million to 
governments). Thus, ENGO programs not connected with the COF risked becoming located 
outside the crucial networks of circulation and negotiation. 
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The emphasis on business models of operation and investment is intensified by the 
foundations’  emphasis  on  program  deliverables,  concrete  “wins,”  and  quantifiable  outcomes, 
which increasingly circulate through some ENGO program articulations and institutional 
practices. The foundations emphasized their intent to fund ENGO campaigns that presented 
crystal-clear articulations of purpose, strategy, tactics, and markers of success, on the scale of the 
whole region. The focus on evaluation and demonstrable outcomes can encourage organizations 
to analyze projects and change unsuccessful activities, but it also forecloses programs that do not 
present quantifiable “successes.” The features of the GBR campaigns that became associated 
with JSP/RSP – protected areas in a status acceptable to First Nations and a conservation fund to 
support sustainable development work – most directly satisfied this demand. If achieved, the 
campaign would offer concrete  “wins” that program officers could easily explain to board 
members. Soon after each of the foundations highlighted their commitment to importing 
performance evaluation techniques from the business sector, Ecotrust Canada committed, with 
the support of funding from the Canadian J.W. McConnell Foundation, to undertake an extensive 
organizational evaluation process every two years. However, its activities remained limited, in 
terms of communities it worked with and its focus on conservation economies (without pursuing 
large-scale protection). The David Suzuki Foundation had a clear strategy in supporting the 
unification of First Nations to become a central actor in conservation planning and in supporting 
the development of sustainable marine economic development to take the pressure off forest 
resources. Further, it emphasized the need for a stringent EBM framework outside the proposed 
conservation areas (DSF 2000). However, because it lacked a clearly defined, tangible project 
end-point, the success of the DSF campaign program was difficult to evaluate. 
Tracing the flow of grants provides evidence of a shift in funding over the ten years 
studied, towards higher grant values and greater centralization of grants to organizations 
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involved in the COF (figure 2). The funding to Ecotrust Canada fluctuates but remains fairly 
consistent. DSF receives a greater proportion over the first years, followed by a greater 
proportion of funds going to RSP jointly, its member groups, or the conservation and sustainable 
development framework, in which they were key negotiators. Both the Tides Foundation in San 
Francisco12 and the Tides Canada Foundation in Vancouver13 play increasingly important roles 
in the dispersal of funds, operating as pass-through organizations and performing the 
accumulation  and  accountability  roles  of  the  “mutual  fund.”  Following the flow of directed 
finances and discursive representations makes visible how negotiated program grants might 
affect policy negotiations by providing or removing the capacity of ENGOs to commit time and 
resources to multi-year campaign strategies. There are two examples, the first suggesting that 
financial and discursive circulations can conjoin within agonistic relations to strengthen ENGO 
voice in the policy field, the second suggesting that disjunctions within these complex relations 
may result in weakened ENGO voices.  
                                                 
12 www.tides.org 
13 tidescanada.org 
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First, the technique of negotiated support and the resulting vision of conservation 
financing forged a powerful relationship between Rockefeller Brothers, Hewlett, and Packard 
Foundations and the Rainforest Solutions Project. From the material reviewed here it is 
impossible to know whether RSP presented a clear analysis and campaign plan that convinced 
foundation staff of the viability of conservation financing in BC; or whether program staff at 
these foundations were committed to conservation financing to leverage sustainable development 
in some areas and conservancy status in others and looked for a group that was willing to take it 
on; or some combination  thereof.  However,  Hewlett’s  emphasis  that  strategic  philanthropy  
consists in negotiating with ENGOs to undertake foundation-driven solutions, rather than the 
“polar  alternative”  of  waiting  for  viable program proposals, suggests the leading role of 
foundations in developing the conservation financing model. Evidence supports this reading: as 
early as 2002, Hewlett Foundation provided funding to the American Trust for Public Land to 
develop legal mechanisms, financing models, and communications strategies for conservation 
financing,  and  in  2003  claimed  that  “with  strong  commitments  to  the  Trust  for  Public  Land  and  
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The Nature Conservancy, the Foundation continues to support technical assistance for public 
finance  strategies”  (Hewlett  2003:  27). The conservation-financing model developed for the 
Great Bear Rainforest was unique to the context, with the COF established through a 
complicated combination of provincial and federal funds, foundation investments, and public 
fundraising managed by these foundations. However, Hewlett’s  experience  in  public  
conservation financing, and the timelines of its articulations, are close enough to the timeframes 
of the development of the details of COF as a core aspect of the BC policy solution to suggest 
that this crucial element of the Great Bear Rainforest solution (Raitio and Saarikoski 2012) was 
developed through the relationships with Hewlett and its network of core funders.  
Alternatively, negotiations over ecosystem-based management (EBM), another key 
aspect of the GBR conservation framework, suggest how policy perspectives may be opened and 
closed by shifting circulations of  financial  and  discursive  resources.  The  focus  on  “winnable”  
standards  for  EBM  has  been  called  “strategic”  (Dempsey  2011),  however, there is evidence of a 
conflict  over  the  “politics  of  definition”  (Wilson  2001: 98-99) of EBM between DSF and RSP. 
RSP stated that it would like higher standards but was willing to live with ones that were 
acceptable to all parties, whereas DSF repeatedly criticized developing EBM standards as 
insufficient to ensure species diversity. That one vision of EBM standards came to prevail in this 
context, and another vision was foreclosed, can be most easily explained by the emphasis that 
RSP placed on forging a solution that both industry and First Nations could accept, support, and 
implement:  “Do  you  feel  right  putting  animal  and  plant  welfare  ahead  of  human  welfare?  We  
don’t,  and  with  your  contributions,  ForestEthics  has  been  working  with  labor  unions  and  timber  
companies in  British  Columbia  to  create  a  future  that  works  for  everyone” (Forest Ethics 2006: 
7). However, the correlation between the direction of funding and the capacity of some ENGOs 
to take more dominant roles in crucial policy debates, such as EBM definition, suggests at 
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minimum  that  foundations’  decisions  regarding  who  to  fund  and  decline,  in  what  values,  over  
what time-frames, and for what activities, can be a significant factor in the inclusion into or 
exclusion from formal policy negotiations and informal networks of circulation. Further, 
stringent EBM standards require removing humans from the center of resource management 
priorities, and thus shift from anthropocentric to biocentric management (Wilson 2001: 97). 
Wilson’s  subsequent  contention that markets are  not  “up to the task of designing and 
implementing  ecosystem  management” suggests that a commitment to strong EBM standards is 
incompatible with market logics of quantification and privatization, raising the risk that 
foundation funding helped diminish the presence of actors that threatened market prioritization. 
The relations of influence between foundations and ENGOs are mutual. The pressure on 
ENGOs to maintain relationships with foundations affects ENGO capacity and focus: the 
intensive process of securing negotiated support shapes specific campaign priorities, strategies, 
and activities, and shortfalls between anticipated and approved budget requests can limit 
intended program activities. Further, negotiated support that emphasizes quantifiable outcomes 
brings additional risks.  On  the  one  hand,  a  project  that  achieves  a  policy  “win”  may  be  viewed  as  
completed,  leaving  funders  free  to  “invest”  elsewhere,  regardless  of  the  challenges  of  
implementation. On the other hand, a project that cannot demonstrate  “success”  may  cause a 
foundation to implement its exit strategy, as “an  organization’s  effectiveness  must  be  continually  
demonstrated  as  new  challenges  appear  and  new  institutions  arise  to  address  them”  (Hewlett  
2001: xii). In other words, the foundations studied here were prepared to divest themselves of 
their ENGO relationships should organizational operations or program outcomes no longer 
appear efficient, effective, targeted, and quantifiable. Yet the pressure on foundations to achieve 
conservation goals through the work of ENGOs necessarily shapes the forms and outcomes of 
foundation investments. Even though ENGO actors are encouraged, though financial pressure 
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and  discursive  techniques,  to  constitute  themselves  as  “appropriate”  subjects,  the  agonistic nature 
of governmentalized relations draws attention to the mobility and mutability of these rationalities 
and the practices they support. ENGOs involved in the GBR campaigns have developed as 
nimble, sophisticated, highly strategic actors, adept at reading and adapting to changing 
circumstances and conditions of possibility (Shaw 2004), in part through the demands of 
navigating and negotiating these intense relations. Therefore, evidence suggests that location 
within networks of financial and discursive circulations offers significant gains along with the 
risks, while exclusion or marginalization from these networks may avoid these risks but 
constrain capacity. Local frictions may generate mutations, but philanthrocapitalist features such 
as financial resources, negotiated relationships, and inter-ENGO competition place significant 
constraints on what mutations are possible.  
 
 
4. CONSERVING THE GREAT BEAR RAINFOREST/MUTATING DEMOCRACY 
 
This research highlights the shifting notions of democratic accountability operating 
through the GBR: the claims to democracy that circulate through foundation and ENGO 
statements are at odds with the political spaces, actors, and authorities generated and circulated 
by their own practices. The traditions of liberal democracy are linked in historically contingent 
ways to formal structures and processes within state governments and to informal practices 
claimed by grassroots and community-based self-government. Labeling the conservation 
framework of the Great Bear Rainforest a  “made-in-BC”  solution  invokes this liberal democratic 
tradition by implying the central role of BC communities and actors in developing the framework 
and the role of the BC government in legislating the framework. However, this study suggests 
that the political economy of financial resources and neoliberal rationalities, even when locally 
mutated, generates different possibilities for and limits to democracy. 
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All three foundations perceive themselves as supporters of democracy. RBF President 
Heintz argues that philanthropy – and the Tocquevillean democratic culture/civil society that it 
supports – ensures healthy capitalism: philanthropy imposes restraint and redistribution on a 
financial structure that threatens the public good. Further, referencing the dual 
grassroots/government conceptions of democracy within modern liberalism, he argues that 
“more  than  a  system,  a  process,  or  a  set  of  institutions,  democracy  is  a  culture,  a  way  of  thinking  
and behaving in society… the culture of democracy is sustained by the experience of community”  
(RBF 2001: 7; emphasis added). Hewlett suggests that “a  vibrant  democratic  society  requires  an  
array of strong nonprofit institutions that allow citizens to come together to express and further 
their  various  concerns  and  interests…these  institutions,  which  constitute  the  core  of  ‘civil  
society’,  contribute  to  pluralism  and  polyarchy  and  provide  important  checks  on  the  power  of  
government  and  the  private  sector”  (Hewlett  2001: xi). Packard further claims  that  “[i]n  many  
ways, private programs are more effective than those of government. By using private funds for 
public purposes, programs of this type [foundation grants] channel the personal commitment of 
millions of individuals  who  participate  as  volunteers  or  donors”  (Packard  1998:  1). Finally, 
Heintz notes that foundations have a responsibility to govern themselves democratically and hold 
themselves publicly accountable for their actions (RBF 2003: 17-18). By nurturing community 
through providing financial support for social programs, by limiting the excesses of capital 
accumulation, and by modeling accountability, foundations therefore claim to be supporting 
democracy at its most fundamental level.  
Similar claims to democratic legitimacy recur throughout the Great Bear Rainforest: 
RAN describes their activities as developing “sustainable  and  democratic  economies”  (RAN  
2006: 4), and Ecotrust, DSF, and SCC-BC emphasize “place-based”  or  “community-based”  
economic development processes driven by local concerns and interests. The importance of this 
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democratic element in policy development, at both the community and the state level, is 
underscored by early criticisms that the Joint Solutions Project was undemocratic. JSP needed to 
appear  “democratized”  if  its  solutions  were  going  to  be  acceptable  to  other  campaigners,  local  
community members, and the province at large (Shaw 2004: 382). This need to emphasize that 
inclusive community and government processes underlie the final agreements is highlighted 
again in the review document produced by RSP (2007: 1-2). 
Prior analyses of American foundation funding in forestry conservation in British 
Columbia have argued that foundations remained external from direct policy actions, and thus 
were sensitive to democratic politics as a domestic concern (Bernstein and Cashore 2000). By 
claiming that “[w]ith  RBF  support  and  encouragement,  environmental  groups  in  BC  have  made  
the  coast  their  primary  conservation  objective”  (RBF:  1999:  25), this indirect role is confirmed. 
However, other references detail direct participation by foundation staff in government-level 
meetings and negotiations. One  report  states  that  “[an  RBF  staff and trustee trip to the Great Bear 
Rainforest] concluded with a productive meeting with the newly elected premier of British 
Columbia that has generated a new level of cooperation among foundations and government 
agencies”  (RBF  2001:  4).  Another report two  years  later  states  that  “over the past two years, the 
RBF has participated in further negotiations that have produced a plan, endorsed by government, 
logging companies, conservation organizations, and the indigenous communities to protect the 
entire  21  million  acre  area”  (RBF  2003:  13). These references are isolated, as expected from 
sensitivities to democratic legitimacy. Further, as fundraising appeals, they characterize RBF and 
its partner foundations as well-positioned to achieve the conservation plan they are promising to 
their foundation peers. Despite these qualifications, it is clear that foundations participated in 
negotiations as direct actors. The “public-private partnership”  of the GBR solution (Hewlett 
2005: x) therefore includes the partnership between government and foundations’  capital  
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investments. This “partnership” suggests the further proliferation of agonistic relations through 
financial and discursive circulations that exceed grants to ENGOs, which makes it crucial to 
pursue further investigations about the accountability of political actors constituted through these 
interwoven transnational relations. 
Further, this highlights the shifting and proliferating political spaces constituted through 
the complex networks of financial and discursive circulations: crucial negotiations and possible 
mutations happen outside the traditional democratic space of domestic policy processes (Raitio 
and Saarikoski 2012). Shaw (2004) suggests that major decisions were made by actors and in 
spaces that are not governed by sovereign authorities, and this study raises further questions 
about the spaces of authority, or of multiple overlapping authorities, that operated in this 
campaign. This highlights the importance of drawing the analytical distinction between formal 
policy authority and other spaces and forms of political authority, for:  
…although  the  agreements  announced  by  the  provincial  government  on  4  
April [2001] were results of government-sponsored processes, we should be 
attentive to the ways in which it was convenient for all parties involved for 
this to appear to be the  case.  …  The  real  locus  of  control,  or  political  
authority, is not nearly so clear cut (Shaw 2004: 382).  
 
Thus, while the state may ultimately decide and institutionalize public policy (Howlett et al. 
2009), the processes of determining the framework of the possible policy solutions creates a 
diversity of spaces as political. It becomes just as crucial, therefore, to trace the spaces 
constituted through the political economies of foundation activities: from the recognized but 
largely unscrutinized financial markets of philanthropic capital investments, to the paths through 
which discursive constructions of conservation priorities and policies are circulated, to the spaces 
of inclusion and exclusion that result from the competitive pressures of negotiated support. 
Finally, it becomes crucial to continue investigations into the long-term commitment and 
ongoing oversight of foundations in a region far from the funding base. This case opens 
 30 
questions about the forces that encourage foundations to stay or move on. Beyond the ecological 
value of the region and the personal attachments of staff or Board, foundation commitment to the 
Great Bear Rainforest is maintained through the financial value of the conserved land and the 
substantial financial investments that have already been made: the Great Bear Rainforest is a 
good financial deal, 6.4 million hectares for only $60 million in private funds. Despite 
foundation and ENGO references to shared participation in and accountability to formal 
structures of state-based democratic politics and informal processes of a local democratic polity, 
the commitment of foundations to the Great Bear Rainforest required a shared prioritization of 
the business models of operation and market-based mechanisms of conservation that define 
philanthrocapitalism. These investigations, therefore, require ongoing theorizations of that way 
that political accountability is potentially reconfigured by techniques of governmentality that 
operate through agonistic political relations and proliferating political spaces. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
  
Despite the loudly announced policy victories in 2001, 2006, and 2007, the conservation of the 
Great Bear Rainforest is not assured, though it is perhaps greatly advanced. This paper addresses 
a considerable gap in analyses of the GBR by focusing attention on the relations between core 
ENGO actors and the foundations that provided substantial financial and institutional support. 
The paper outlines techniques of neoliberal philanthropy and traces the circulation of financial 
resources and representational practices within the agonistic relations between foundations and 
ENGOs. While suggestive rather than conclusive, this research highlights that venture 
philanthropy needs to be understood as institutions, discourses, and daily practices that 
increasingly circulate neoliberal rationalities, reconfiguring recipient organizations and being 
subtly reconfigured through spatially diverse frictions.  Further, the complex political economies 
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of foundation funding raise crucial questions about inherited notions of democracy as a particular 
configuration of political space, political actors, and political authority. The politics of what 
constitutes democracy, and how it should relate to equally contingent notions of conservation, 
local community, state, and economic development, are being reconstituted through complex 
negotiations with neoliberal rationalities. We therefore need to develop new theorizations of 
democratic practice and accountability, in order to analyze adequately the political implications 
of the Great Bear Rainforest. This work has begun in many fields, and studying philanthropic 
foundations is an important addition to this work. 
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February 7, 2007.  
 
 
Greenpeace Canada 
 
No published Annual Reports. 
 
Forest View Newsletters 
2001 summer: http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/canada/en/documents-and-
links/publications/forest-views-summer-2001.pdf 
2001 winter: http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/canada/en/documents-and-
links/publications/forest-views-winter-2001.pdf 
2002 spring: http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/canada/en/documents-and-
links/publications/forest-views-spring-2002.pdf 
2003 spring: http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/canada/en/documents-and-
links/publications/forest-views-spring-2003.pdf 
2004 fall: http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/canada/en/documents-and-
links/publications/forest-views-newsletter-fall.pdf 
 
Greenpeace  Canada.  2006.  “Greenpeace Celebrates Huge Victoria Ten Years in the Making for 
Canada’s  Rainforest.”  Press  Release  (February  7).  Available  at:  
http://www.greenpeace.org/canada/en/campaigns/greatbear/latest/great-bear-victory; 
accessed March 20, 2007. 
 
 
Sierra Club of Canada – BC Chapter 
 
Annual Reports 
2000: http://sierraclub.ca/bc/aa-bc_upload/fd5c29a62a2f2c66bdb73ed43cec4361/AR_2000.pdf 
Page 1-7, 19-end 
2001: http://sierraclub.ca/bc/aa-bc_upload/fd5c29a62a2f2c66bdb73ed43cec4361/AR_2001.pdf 
Page 1-2, 8-end 
2002: http://sierraclub.ca/bc/aa-
bc_upload/fd5c29a62a2f2c66bdb73ed43cec4361/SCC_BC_02AR.pdf  
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2004: http://www.sierraclub.ca/bc/aa-
bc_upload/fd5c29a62a2f2c66bdb73ed43cec4361/SCBC_annualreport_05.pdf  
2005: 
http://www.sierraclub.ca/bc/publications/annualreports/BC%20Foundation%20Annual%20R
eport%202005.pdf 
 
GBR info from website 
http://www.sierraclub.ca/bc/programs/wildlands/issue.shtml?x=6&als%5BURL_ITEM%5D=f35
c8788614ee7c5fef24c5ffc2e988a 
http://www.sierraclub.ca/bc/programs/wildlands/issue.shtml?x=6&als%5BURL_ITEM%5D=f35
c8788614ee7c5fef24c5ffc2e988a 
http://www.sierraclub.ca/bc/programs/wildlands/issue.shtml?x=965&als[URL_ITEM]=55cbb7e
080ccc47309e1d23f3acc599e 
http://www.sierraclub.ca/bc/programs/wildlands/issue.shtml?x=967&als[URL_ITEM]=3d4bdd3f
4b3801c5302a9956c1fc82e5 
http://www.sierraclub.ca/bc/programs/wildlands/issue.shtml?x=966&als[URL_ITEM]=61355ba
4c3a13fdd79f833b15681a6a8 
 
 
Rainforest Action Network 
 
Annual Reports 
2000: http://ran.org/fileadmin/materials/executive/annual_reports/RAN_AnnualReport2000.pdf  
2001: http://ran.org/fileadmin/materials/executive/annual_reports/RAN_AnnualReport2001.pdf  
2002: http://ran.org/fileadmin/materials/executive/annual_reports/RAN_AnnualReport2002.pdf 
2003: http://ran.org/fileadmin/materials/executive/annual_reports/RAN_AnnualReport2003.pdf 
2004: missing due to change in fiscal year 
2005: http://ran.org/fileadmin/materials/executive/annual_reports/RAN_AnnualReport2005.pdf 
2006: http://ran.org/fileadmin/materials/executive/annual_reports/RAN_AnnualReport2006.pdf 
 
 
INTERNET  RESOURCES AND LINKS – OTHER 
 
Coastal First Nations (Turning Point Initative) 
 
2005 December: http://sierraclub.ca/bc/aa-
bc_upload/fd5c29a62a2f2c66bdb73ed43cec4361/TP_ENGO_statement_dec05.pdf (Joint 
statement with RSP) 
 
 
COFI/CFCI 
 
Coast  Forest  Conservation  Initiative.  2007.  “CIII  Funding  Announcement.”  Available  at:  
http://www.coastforestconservationinitiative.com/pdf7/Media_January_21_2.pdf; accessed 
on February 27, 2007. [this is a compilation of media coverage of the February 2007 
conservation announcement by BC; CIII, Conservation Investment and Incentives Initiative 
is the term used with American foundations to designate conservation financing]. 
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British Columbia 
 
British Columbia. 2001a. The General Protocol Agreement on Land Use Planning and Interim 
Measures. Available at: http://www.davidsuzuki.org/files/FinalProtocol.pdf; accessed on 
February 27, 2007. 
 
-----.  2001b.  “Coastal  Plan  Creates  Unique  Protection  Area,  Economic  Agreement and New 
Opportunities  for  First  Nations.”  News  Release:  Office  of  the  Premier.  Available  at:  
http://ilmbwww.gov.bc.ca/lup/lrmp/coast/cencoast/news/nr4401.htm; accessed March 23, 
2007.  
 
-----. 2002a. BC Coast Strategy Progress Report. Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management. 
Available at: 
http://ilmbwww.gov.bc.ca/ilmb/lup/coastal/coaststrategy/docs/ProgressReport.pdf; accessed 
March 23, 2007. 
 
-----. 2002b. Deed of Trust Establishing the Coast Sustainability Trust. Blair Dwyer and 
Company, Victoria. Available at: 
http://ilmbwww.gov.bc.ca/ilmb/lup/coastal/coaststrategy/docs/TrustDeedMarch28final.pdf; 
accessed March 23, 2007. 
 
-----. 2002c. Coast Sustainability Trust: Results-Based Assessment Framework. Appendix A. 
Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management. Available at: 
http://ilmbwww.gov.bc.ca/ilmb/lup/coastal/coaststrategy/docs/TrustFundperfmgmtframewor
k.pdf; accessed March 23, 2007.  
 
-----.  2004a.  “Premier  Announces  Government  Initiative  to  Create  Spirit  Bear  Conservancy.”  
News Release: Office of the Premier and Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management. 
2004SRM0025-000578 (July 17). Available at: http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/archive/2001-
2005/2004SRM0025-000578.pdf; accessed April 24, 2007. 
 
-----.  2004b.  “Agreements  Move  Coastal  Land  Use  Plans  Forward.”  Backgrounder: Office of the 
Premier and Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management. 2004SRM0025-000578 (July 
17). Available at: http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/archive/2001-2005/2004SRM0025-000578-
Attachment1.pdf; accessed April 24, 2007. 
 
-----.  2006a.  “Province  Announces  a  New  Vision  for  Coastal  B.C.”  News  Release:  Ministry  of  
Agriculture and Lands and Office of the Premier. 2006AL0002-000066 (Feb. 7). Available 
at: http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/news_releases_2005-2009/2006AL0002-000066.htm; 
accessed on February 27, 2007. 
 
-----.  2006b.  “Province  Announces  a  New  Vision  for  Coastal  B.C.”  Backgrounder:  Ministry  of  
Agriculture and Lands and Office of the Premier. 2006AL0002-000066 (Feb. 7) 
http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/news_releases_2005-2009/2006AL0002-000066-
Attachment1.htm; accessed on February 27, 2007. 
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-----.  2006c.  “Amendments  to  the  Park  Act  and  Protected  Areas  of  British  Columbia  Act.”  
Backgrounder: Ministry of Environment. 2006ENV0028-000477 (April 24). Available at: 
http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/news_releases_2005-2009/2006ENV0028-000477-
Attachment1.pdf; accessed March 23, 2007. 
 
-----.  2006d.  “British  Columbia  Leads  in  Creation  of  Protected Areas.”  News  Release:  Ministry  
of Environment. 2006ENV0028-000477 (April 24). Available at: 
http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/news_releases_2005-2009/2006ENV0028-000477.pdf; 
accessed March 23, 2007.  
 
-----.  2007a.  “$120M  for  Coast  Economic  Development  and  Conservation.”  News  
Release/Communiqué: Office of the Premier and Environment Canada (Canada). 
2007)TP0003-000046. Available at: http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/news_releases_2005-
2009/2007OTP0003-000046.pdf; accessed March 23, 2007.  
 
-----.  2007b.  “Central  and  North  Coast  – One  Year  Later.”  News  Release:  Ministry  of  
Agriculture and Lands. 2007AL0003-000103 (Feb. 7). Available at: 
http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/news_releases_2005-2009/2007AL0003-000103.pdf; accessed 
March 23, 2007.  
 
-----.  N.d.  b.  “Coast  Rainforests  of  British  Columbia,  Canada:  Planning  Update.”  Ministry  of  
Sustainable Resource Management. Available at: 
http://ilmbwww.gov.bc.ca/ilmb/lup/coastal/coaststrategy/docs/PlanningUpdate.pdf; accessed 
March 23, 2007. (written between April and May, 2002). 
 
-----.  N.d.  a.  “Summary  of  Land  and  Resource  Protocol  Agreement  Between  Turning  Point  First  
Nations and the Province  of  BC.”  Available  at:  
http://ilmbwww.gov.bc.ca/ilmb/lup/lrmp/coast/cencoast/docs/fn_agreements/turning_point
_province_summary.pdf; accessed on March 23, 2007. 
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